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I. INTRODUCTION

Every day, U.S. businesses enter into international transactions
with new partners in the form of joint ventures, financings, investments,
licensing, supply, purchase, and other arrangements. What do they
know about these new partners? In some instances, these new partners
may be well-known companies, which are publicly-traded and watched
by professional analysts and rating agencies. In many instances, little
may be known about them. They may be small or newly-established.
They also may be located in new markets, where there is limited
experience or expertise.
During negotiations, significant attention is paid to the merits of
the business relationship itself (price, capability, compatibility, synergy,
competitive advantage, etc.). Questions of reputation and integrity are
more difficult and awkward to investigate. Extensive background
checks and investigative "due diligence" can also be costly, disruptive
and, ultimately, unhelpful in unearthing criminal activity or association
and other questions of reputation, ethics, and business practice.
Clearly, transactions with organizations engaged in criminal
activity bring harm to one's reputation. They may also result in serious
civil and criminal liability for organizations and individuals subject to
U.S. money laundering laws. These laws seek to punish persons who
do business with criminals and thereby help them utilize the proceeds
of their unlawful activity. The money laundering laws of the United
States are known to be the toughest in the world and call for stiff
penalties, including fines, confinement, and asset forfeiture. 1
The problem of "knowing your partner" is perhaps most acute in
emerging markets. There, accurate and unbiased information is usually
difficult to find. Corruption may be commonplace, and standard
business practices may include some violations of local law. Moreover,
if the banking system and financial services industries in the emerging
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1. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(l)(B)(ii), (2)(B)(ii) (2004).
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market are not adequately regulated or monitored, they may become
cozy homes for the transfer and laundering of funds by organized
criminals and terrorists.
Such concerns inspired certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act ("Patriot Act"). 2 In addition to increasing surveillance authority for
law enforcement and imposing new internal compliance measures for
banks and other financial institutions, the Patriot Act also expanded the
money laundering laws in three key respects that affect international
business transactions. As more fully described below, the Patriot Act:
(1) clarified that "foreign persons" are subject to civil asset seizures and
forfeitures; 3 (2) expanded the law to cover money laundering
transactions made through foreign banks; 4 and (3) extended the list of
predicate offenses to include, most notably, any foreign corruption, 5
whereas previously such corruption had to amount to a violation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"). 6
U.S. money laundering laws are themselves broad and, as the
discussion below will illustrate, lacking some technical coherency.
Many key issues relating to their scope are undefined, lack guidance
from case law, and rest on artificial distinctions. Breadth and ambiguity
makes circumvention of these laws difficult, thereby facilitating the
efforts of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to use them to fight
international organized crime and terrorist financing. Moreover, the
same concepts that are embodied in U.S. law are also included, or slated
for inclusion, in the laws of other countries. 7 The U.S. government also
has had some success in its effort to bring about greater international
enforcement. These efforts, together with developments in money
laundering case law, demonstrate that the range of activities captured by
money laundering legislation is likely to grow, both in the U.S. and
abroad. In particular, recently, U.S. case law has established that
foreign tax evasion may form the basis of wire fraud, a predicate
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56 (Oct. 26,
2001).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2) (2004).
4. See id. § 1956(c)(6)(B) (extending the term "financial institution" to include any
"foreign bank").
5. See id. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv) (" ... an offense against a foreign nation
involving ... bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft or embezzlement of
public funds by or for the benefit of a public official").
6. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2004).
7. See Council of Europe Convention, No. 141, on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/En/Treaties/html/141.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
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offense for purposes of money laundering. 8 In addition, U.S. money
laundering laws may reach a U.S. citizen who transfers funds between
two other countries even if he or she commits the offense while located
offshore, or a foreign citizen who orders the transfer of funds into or out
of the United States while abroad. 9 Accordingly, while present law is
technical in nature, little comfort should be drawn from any perceived
gaps or safe harbors that such technicalities may create. Rather, the
breadth and ambiguity of the law create risks for legitimate business
seeking to explore new markets and new opportunities with new
partners.
This article seeks to draw attention to the importance of
understanding and mitigating the risks associated with the broad sweep
of U.S. money laundering laws for persons pursuing new business
relationships, such as new ventures in emerging markets. This article
first examines the technical aspects of U.S. money laundering laws in
the context of international transactions, and then provides
recommendations for measured due diligence and other steps that work
to reduce exposure to them by complying with the law's implicit "know
your partner" requirement.
For purposes of illustration, this article uses the example of a
company organized or based in the United States (the "U.S. parent")
contemplating a foreign project (the "international project") with a new
partner located in an emerging market (the "new foreign partner"). The
U.S. parent may participate directly or through a company that it
controls in Europe (the "European subsidiary"). The officers, directors,
and employees of the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, and the new
foreign parent involved in the international project (the "employees")
will include U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and others.
II. ANALYSIS

Generally speaking, liability under U.S. money laundering laws
attaches if (a) an offense that is recognized as a predicate offense for
money laundering in the United States is committed, (b) the proceeds of
such offense are used in a transaction, and (c) the defendant participated
in the transaction knowing, or being willfully blind to the fact, that such
proceeds were derived from unlawful activity. 10 To some degree, the
8. See infra text accompanying notes 76-102 .
9. See infra text accompanying notes 24, 52-57.
10. See generally OTTO G. 0BERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES (2003); Daniel H. April and Angelo M.
Grasso, Money Laundering, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 839 (2002); Christopher Boran, Money
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extent to which the defendant also intended, or knew that the perpetrator
of the offense intended, to use the transaction to disguise and conceal
the source of the proceeds will also be relevant. Almost all felonies
committed wholly or partly in the United States for money or other
commercially-useable resource (such as murder-for-hire, drug
trafficking, larceny, bribery, wire fraud, etc.) are recognized as predicate
offenses for the purposes of money laundering.
There are several statutes that prohibit money laundering and
related offenses under Title 18 of the United States Code. This article
will focus on Sections 1956 (money laundering) and 1957 ("money
spending," i.e., monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful
activity), which are similar in content and application. In addition,
some transactions may also run afoul of Sections 2314 (transportation
of stolen money), and 1962 ("RICO"). There are also statutes
criminalizing conspiracy to commit money laundering (Section
1956(h)), and aiding and abetting any of the foregoing crimes (Section
2). To the extent the defendant also committed, facilitated, or otherwise
was involved in the predicate offense itself (e.g. mail or wire fraud or an
FCPA violation), a prosecution for money laundering may include these
charges as well.
Most U.S. money laundering indictments are brought against the
same individual who perpetrated the underlying (predicate) crime (e.g.,
the drug dealer who attempts to launder the proceeds of his crime). In
addition, there is a significant body of cases brought against persons
who, in some way, wittingly helped the perpetrator utilize, dispose of,
or launder his proceeds (e.g., the bank, the courier, the merchant, or the
lawyer). Applying this principle to the illustration, if the new foreign
partner contributes ill-gotten assets to the international project, there is
potential money laundering liability not only for him, but also for any
other person (individual or corporate entity) participating in the
international project, such as the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary,
and the employees, depending on what they knew.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of US. Money Laundering Statutes

Because most of the activity concerning the international project is
likely to be conducted outside the United States, it is important to
consider first, to what extent may U.S. money laundering laws be
applied extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons (e.g., the foreign
Laundering, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 847 (2003); William G. Phelps, Validity, Construction
and Application of 18 U.S.C.A . 1956, which Criminalizes Money Laundering, 121 A.LR.
FED. 525 (2004).
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employees, the new foreign partner, and the international project
company), or to conduct by U.S. persons (e.g., the U.S. employees, the
U.S. parent, and the European subsidiary) occurring abroad?
Generally, U.S. money laundering laws may be applied
extraterritorially to actions of U.S. persons abroad and to actions of nonU.S. persons undertaken inside, or partially inside, the United States.11
However, the U.S. has faced criticism for the extension of its criminal
prosecutions to activities occurring principally abroad. Prior to
commencing grand jury investigations or returning an indictment based
solely on extraterritorial jurisdiction, prosecutors must receive approval
of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the criminal
division of the DOJ. 12 The prosecutorial decision includes weighing the
seriousness of the predicate crime committed, the degree of a
defendant's involvement, the effect on, or connection to, the United
States, and the availability of evidence.
Although applied similarly, Sections 1956 and 1957 have certain
technical distinctions creating some ambiguity with respect to their
coverage. Specifically, extraterritorial jurisdiction for Section 1956
depends on whether the defendant is a "U.S. citizen", whether conduct
occurs at least "in part" in the United States and whether over $10,000
is involved:
There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this
section if(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a nonUnited States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States;
and
(2) the transaction or series of transactions involved funds or monetary
instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.13

By contrast, extraterritorial jurisdiction under § 1957 depends on
whether the defendant falls within a broad, but technical definition of a
"U.S. person":
that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States
and [the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States], but the defendant is a United States person (as defined in
section 3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in

11. In this context, "U.S. persons" are generally, U.S. citizens and residents, and
companies organized within the United States and their foreign subsidiaries.
12. OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra note 10 § 2A.04[1] (citing DOJ MANUAL § 9105.300).
13. 18 u.s.c. § 1956(f) (2004).
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Section 3077 of Title 18 (excluding paragraph (2)(D)) defines "United
States person" as:
(A) a national of the United States as defined in section 10l(a)(22) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act;
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act;
(C) any person within the United States; ...
(E) a sole proprietorship, partnership, company, or association
composed principally of nationals or permanent resident aliens of the
United States; and
(F) a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, any
State, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the
United States, and a foreign subsidiary of such corporation. 15

The term "foreign subsidiary" is undefined by statute or relevant
case law. Consistent with the broad sweep of Section 3077(2), the DOJ
and the courts may apply the term as liberally as necessary to prevent
circumvention with a focus on whether the U.S. corporation effectively
controlled the activities of the foreign entity. Accordingly, in our
example, the European subsidiary should qualify, and the international
project company may qualify, as a "U.S. person" for purposes of
establishing jurisdiction over their actions taken outside the United
States. In addition, under Section 3077(2)(E), foreign companies may
qualify as U.S. persons if "composed principally of' U.S. nationals or
residents. 16
These differences create at least three noteworthy points of
distinction.
Transactional Amount

First, Sections 1956 and 1957 specify $10,000, as a threshold

14. 18 u.s.c. § 1957(d) (2004).
15. Id.§ 3077(2). "The term 'national of the United States' means: (A) a citizen of the
United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes
permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2004). "The term
lawfully admitted for permanent residence means: the status of having been lawfully
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in
accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." Id. § 1101(a)(20).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3077(2)(E) (2004).
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transactional amount, but Section 1957 lacks specific reference to the
possibility of aggregating a series of transactions in order to reach such
threshold amount, as is expressly permitted by Section 1956. 17 Courts
have applied the principle of lenity to find that Section 1957 requires
each transaction to be greater than $10,000. 18 Accordingly, in
prosecuting offenders who have structured their business arrangements
as a series of transactions under the $10,000 threshold, prosecutors may
rely on jurisdiction under Section 1956, although the DOJ continues to
believe that there may be exceptions to the non-aggregation rule under
Section 1957. 19
Applicability of Criminal Liability to Foreign Legal Entities and
Organizations

Second, while Sections 1956 and 1957 apply domestically to
"whoever" commits the offense, be it an individual, corporation, or
other organization, the extraterritorial subsection of Section 1956
(subsection (f) ), refers only to "United States citizen" and "non-United
States citizen" as within its ambit. 20 It is not clear whether the use of
these terms was intended to suggest that the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of Section 1956 should apply onlri to individuals, as opposed to
corporations or other organizations. 1 By contrast, Section 1957(d)
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)(2004).
18. United States v. Jenkins, 58 F.3d 611, 613 (11th Cir. 1995); accord United States v.
Brown, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12310 at 11 (4th Cir. 1998) (following Jenkins, but finding
that a lump sum payment for several automobiles each of which was valued at less than
$10,000 qualified as a single transaction).
19. See GREDD ET AL., MONEY LAUNDERING, § 2A.03[3], Citing DOJ MANUAL § 9105A.OOO at 281-82 (suggesting that if "several transactions are so closely related as to
constitute phases or divisions of a single transaction, the property may be aggregated for
purposes of charging a single violation of § 1957[, t]he purchase of an automobile in
installments totaling over $10,000 [being] an obvious example of this"). Id.
20. See United States v. Peterson, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20336 (6th Cir. 1999), citing
United States v. Carter, 311F.2d934, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1963) and Continental Baking Co. v.
United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960). "[A] corporation, through the conduct of
its agents and employees, may be convicted of a crime, including a crime involving
knowledge and [willfulness]. .. [if] its officer's or agent's illegal conduct be related to and
done within the course of his employment and have some connection with the furtherance of
the business of such corporation." Peterson, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20336, at "'*12.
21. The term "United States citizen" is not defined in section 1956(t), but is
encountered elsewhere in the United States Code, in contexts often (but not always)
referring only to individuals. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 8 U.S.C. § 1101; 10 U.S.C. §
1060a(g)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 713c-3; but see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40102(15) (defining ''citizen of
the United States" as including certain legal entities, for purposes of carriers of air
transportation); 46 U.S.C. § 802 (defining "citizen" of the United States as including certain
legal entities, for purposes of shipping). According to legislative history, the purpose of §
1956(t) is to ensure that extraterritorial applications are limited to significant cases in
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makes no reference to "citizen," and, for purposes of civil liability,
Section 1956 (b) clearly applies to any "person" including foreign
banks. 22
Interestingly, research reveals no reported cases applying
extraterritorial jurisdiction under Sections 1956(t) or 1957(d) other than
to individuals. Prosecution of legal entities organized and operating
abroad would appear to be problematic for a variety of reasons (e.g., the
availability of evidence). However, there is no legislative history,
precedent, or apparent rationale for limiting the extraterritorial
application of U.S. money laundering laws to individuals.
Sufficiency of Conduct Occurring Only Partly in the United States
Third, Section 1956(t) requires that the conduct of a non-United
States citizen occur at least "in part" in the United States. 23 This does
not, however, mean that the defendant must have been physically
present within U.S. borders at some point during the commission of the
offense. In United States v. Stein, the district court found that a foreign
citizen who causes or orders a transfer of proceeds from or to the United
States by telephone or other means while abroad is deemed to have
acted "in" the United States for purposes of Section 1956(t). 24
Similarly, with respect to civil liability, Section 1956(b)(2) focuses not
operating wholly abroad from U.S. laws. See generally United States v. Stein, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8471 at 12-14 (E.D. La. 1994), citing S. Rep. No. 99-433 at 14; Trujillo v.
Banco Central del Ecuador, 35 F.Supp. 2d 908 (S.D.Fl. 1998), citing S. Rep. No. 99-433, at
14. No mention is made of a desire to protect U.S. corporations from liability while
operating abroad.
22. As a result of the Patriot Act, section 1956 now provides specifically for civil
liability for foreign financial institutions and other "foreign persons" (see infra text
accompanying notes 39-41 below). One may view this change in law as an effort by
Congress either to close the apparent gap and, thus, reaffirming the applicability of section
1956 to foreign entities, or to clarify that foreign entities bear at least civil liability for their
acts in violation of section 1956.
23. 18 u.s.c. § 1956(f) (2004).
24. United States v. Stein; No. 93-375-Sec. "N'', 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8471, at *1314 (E.D. La. 1994). "[S]ection 1956 was not intended to only apply when the defendant acts
within the borders of this country. Rather it was intended to reach situations in which 'the
transaction occurred in whole or in part in the United States,"' citing S. Rep. No. 99-433, at
14. "It is the entire transaction that forms the offense conduct, not merely its initiation or
conclusion." Id. "If, as it is alleged in this case, a defendant, who never enters this country,
initiates a transfer of funds from a place within the United States to place outside the United
States, there will be extraterritorial jurisdiction, because a portion of the conduct occurred in
this country." Id.; see also United States v. Approximately $25,829,681.80 in Funds, No. 98
Civ. 2682, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18499 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
2994 (2d Cir. 2003) (following Stein and finding that wire transfers activated from abroad
that caused a transfer of funds from the United States constitutes conduct "occurring in part
in the United States" for purposes of§ 1956(f)).
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on whether any of defendant's "conduct" occurred in the United States,
but rather whether any part of the "financial transaction" occurred in the
United States. 25 Thus, a defendant may be convicted under Section
1956 when acting wholly abroad if he causes the transfer of funds or
other property to or from the United States.
By contrast, Section 1957 focuses on whether the offense occurred
"in" the United States (in which case, anyone is liable) or abroad (in
which case, only "U.S. persons" are liable). 26 Again, no helpful case
law on this point was found; therefore, what is meant by "in" the United
States under Section 1957(d), as distinct from "in part" in the United
States under Section 1957(f), is unclear. One might conclude that
Stein's conduct would not be covered by Section 1957. Moreover,
because Section 1957 requires the offense, arguably as a whole, to occur
in the United States (as opposed to merely the conduct, constituting a
component of the offense to occur at least partly in the United States),
its application to non-U.S. persons with respect to conduct or a
transaction occurring partly abroad may be more problematic.
Summary ofExtraterritorial Jurisdiction
Based on the foregoing and despite certain limitations and
uncertain distinctions, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. money
laundering laws is potentially quite broad.
Moreover, although
heretofore relatively infrequently exercised, geopolitical mandates and
circumstances are likely to inspire their greater use. A matrix of
potential criminal liability is set forth as Table 1.
Table 1
DEFENDANT

An entity that is a "U.S. person," i.e.,
(1) an entity organized or operating
within the United States, or (2) a
foreign subsidiary of a corporation
organized in the United States, or (3)
an entity "composed principally of
national or permanent resident aliens
o the United States "

PLACE OF

§ 1956

§ 1957

CRIMINAL

CRIMINAL

LIABILITY?

LIABILITY?

in the United
States

Yes

Yes

outside
the
United States

Unclear

Yes

CONDUCT

25. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
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any other entity or organization

an individual who is a U.S. citizen

an individual who is not a U.S. citizen
but who is a resident alien or other
U.S. person

an individual who is none of the above

outside
the
United States
in the United
States

No

No

Yes

Yes

outside
the
United States
in the United
States

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

outside
the
United States
in the United
States

As Table 1 shows, in many instances, both Sections 1956 and 1957
capture extraterritorial conduct and, in some instances, where the
applicability of Section 1956 extraterritorially is not available or
unclear, Section 1957 is clearly applicable (e.g., conduct by entities
constituting "U.S. persons" under Section 3077(2) oftitle 18, or conduct
In short, the
by resident aliens who are not U.S. citizens). 28
circumstances where there is clearly no liability under either statute are
narrow:

27. See, e.g., United States v. Tronson, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10786 at 5 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that a money laundering conviction under section 1956 was proper against a
foreign citizen defendant when it was shown that part of the conduct occurred in the United
States); United States v. Sadighi, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 27994 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
telephone calls to a co-conspirator U.S. citizen in the United States, as well as bank transfers
from abroad to the United States was sufficient for extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
citizen for conspiracy to commit money laundering under section 1956(h)).
28. 18 u.s.c. § 3077(2) (2004).
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•

A foreign entity that does not qualify as a "U.S. person" is
not liable for conduct occurring wholly abroad.
• An individual who is neither a resident alien nor a citizen
of the United States is not liable for conduct occurring
wholly abroad.
At the same time, textual differences between Sections 1956 and
1957 create some uncertainty. Specifically,
• Extraterritorial liability under Section 1956 may apply only
to individuals. 29
• Section 1957 does note clarify whether it applies to
offenses occurring only "partly" in the United States. 30
• Section 1957 does not expressly permit aggregation of
related transactions to reach the $10,000 jurisdictional
threshold. 31
• Section 1957 only applies to transactions conducted
through a financial institution. 32
• Section 1956 only applies to transactions involving
"monetary instruments" and "funds."33
These distinctions create the following unintended potential
prosecutorial gaps:
• Prosecution of a foreign organization that is not a "U.S.
person" for conduct occurring only partly in the United
States;
• Prosecution of anyone (except a U.S. citizen) for an offense
occurring wholly abroad and either (a) not involving a
financial institution or (b) involving transactions less than
$10,000 each in value.
• Prosecution of a non-U.S. person for a transaction not
involving monetary instruments or funds (e.g., a barter of
goods) occurring only partly in the United States.
Although these and other nuances exist in the text of the law, one
should be cautioned that they are not safe harbors, as there would
appear to be no clear rationale, policy, or other basis for them.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
See infra text accompanying notes 66-67.
See supra text accompanying note 13.
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Penalties
Criminal Penalties
For each count of money laundering under Section 1956, the
maximum penalties are significant - twenty years of confinement and a
fine of $500,000 or, if greater, up to twice the defendant's gross gain (or
the victim's gross loss) if not unduly complicating the case. 34 Penalties
under Section 1957 are similar - the maximum confinement period per
count is ten years, and the same maximum fines apply. 35
Each instance of a defendant's participation in any transaction or
transfer of tainted funds could constitute one count of money
laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering, or aiding and
abetting money laundering. These counts could multiply quickly in an
investment situation. By way of illustration, the U.S. parent or
European subsidiary might participate in the initial investment by the
new foreign partner through project and investment agreements. An
employee might authorize or otherwise participate in the utilization of
such funds in payments to third party contractors. Each transaction or
other instance of participation could also trigger additional (nonmultiplicitous) liability under other statutes. Thus, the penalties could
add up, as numerous transactions and transfers occur.
Civil Penalties
A civil penalty of $10,000 or the value of the funds involved
(whichever is feater) may also be applied for each violation of Section
1956 or 1957. 6 In addition, the DOJ may commence a civil forfeiture
proceeding against the illicit proceeds of a foreign legal entity involved
in money laundering if such proceeds are in the United States. 37 In one
such case, the assets of a Russian Bank (Sobinbank) were held in a civil
forfeiture proceeding on the theory that Sobinbank was knowingly
involved in a money laundering scheme in violation of Section 1956. 38
The Sobinbank case was apparently a rare instance of the DOJ
proceeding against a foreign bank's correspondent account under a
Section 1956 theory, and the first time it did so based on the predicate

34. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(ii), (2)(B)(ii) (2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d)
(2004).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(2) (2004).
36. 18 u.s.c. § 1956(b)(l) (2004).
37. 18 u.s.c. § 981 (2004).
38. United States v. $15,270,885.69 Formerly on Deposit in Account No. 8900261137,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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crime of wire fraud involving a scheme to defraud a foreign government
oftaxes. 39
In October 2001, Section 1956(b), providing a civil cause of action
by the government against any person who commits a money
laundering offense, was amended by Section 317 of the Patriot Act to
give clearer long-arm jurisdiction over such foreign money launderers. 40
Section 1956(b) now permits the government to bring a civil suit against
a foreign person, including a foreign bank, that committed a money
laundering offense but could not be found in the United States. Further,
the Section also provides that the court has jurisdiction if the money
laundering offense occurred in part in the United States, or the foreign
bank has a correspondent account in the United States.41
Specifically, Section 1956(b)(2) provides:
(2) Jurisdiction over foreign persons. For purposes of adjudicating an
action filed or enforcing a penalty ordered under this section, the
district courts shall have jurisdiction over any foreign person.
including any financial institution authorized under the laws of a
foreign countrv, against whom the action is brought, if service of
process upon the foreign person is made under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or the laws of the country in which the foreign person
is found, and(A) the foreign person commits an offense under subsection (a)
involving a financial transaction that occurs in whole or in part in the
United States;
(B) the foreign person converts, to his or her own use, property in
which the United States has an ownership interest by virtue of the
entry of an order of forfeiture by a court of the United States; or
(C) the foreign person is a financial institution that maintains a bank
account at a financial institution in the United States.42

Although the term "foreign person" is not defined, it clearly includes
financial institutions. Accordingly, application to other foreign legal
entities and organizations would appear contemplated (or, at least, the
argument is stronger with respect to the term "foreign person" than the
term "citizen" used in Section 1956(f)). In this respect, the activities of

39. See "Court Approves Use of Laundering Law to Attack Foreign Tax Evasion,"
Money
Laundering
Alert,
Nov.
2000,
at
http://www.moneylaundering.com/ArticleDisplay .aspx?id= 17 54) (requires subscription).
40. Patriot Act, supra note 2, § 31 7.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2)(A), (C), as amended by Patriot Act, supra note 2, § 317.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2) (2004) (emphasis added).
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the European subsidiary, the international project company, and even
foreign employees may be subject to civil penalty (even if they escape
criminal liability under Section 1956(f)), if some aspect of the offending
transaction occurred in the United States.
Elements of Offenses

Sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18 of the United States Code
prohibit various forms of money laundering. The potential offenses that
are most relevant to business transactions with new partners are those
offenses requiring only some form of knowledge as the requisite
scienter. 43 These include
• Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) ("general laundering"),
• Section
1956(a)(2)(B)(i)
("cross-border
money
laundering"), and
• Section 1957(a) ("money spending").
They are all similar in content, as shown in Table 2. There is
considerable overlap between Sections 1956 and 1957, and indictments
often include more than one money laundering offense and more than
one theory of money laundering.
Table 2
Elements
of Offense
1

Conduct

2
Transaction

General Money
Laundering (§
1956 a 1 B
The defendant
conducted or
attempted to
conduct

a "financial
transaction"

The defendant
transmitted,
transported or
transferred, or
attempted to
transmit, transport,
or transfer across the
United States border
a "monetary
instrument or funds"

Money
Spending(§
1957 a
(similar to
General
Money
Laundering)44

a "monetary
transaction"

43. Other forms of money laundering, not discussed in this article, focus on a
defendant's intent, on activity intended to evade federal reporting requirements, on the
transportation of funds into and out of the United States, and on sting operations.
44. Section 1957 requires that the defendant "engages or attempts to engage in a
monetary transaction." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2004).
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that "involves" the
proceeds of
"specified unlawful
activity"
4
knowing that the
Knowledge funds were
of Illegality proceeds of "some
form of unlawful
activity"
and knowing that
5
Knowledge the transaction was
of Intent to designed to
Conceal
"conceal or
disguise the nature,
the location, the
source, the
ownership or the

(same as General
Money Laundering,
arguably implied)45
(same as General
Money Laundering)
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(similar to
General
Money
Laundering)46
(similar to
General
Money
Laundering)47

(same as General Not required
Money Laundering)

45. The requirement that the transaction actually involve proceeds of specified
unlawful activity is generally viewed as implied. Section 1956(a)(2) requires either that the
defendant acted "with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity"
(subparagraph (A)) or that the defendant knew that the transfer was "designed in whole or in
part... to conceal or disguise ...the proceeds of specified unlawful activity" (subparagraph
(B)(i)), subject to the exception that the latter knowledge test may be satisfied by a law
enforcement sting operation. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2),(b)(i) (2004); See also OBERMAIER &
MORVILLO, supra note 10, § 2A.02[2][d][ii] (2001) (noting that the DOJ recognizes that
proof that the proceeds are from a specified unlawful activity is implicitly required, citing
DOJ MANUAL§ 9-105A.OOO at 272). But see id. § 2A.02[2][d][i] (noting that because proof
that the proceeds are from a specified unlawful activity is not expressly required, section
1956(a)(2) is available for sting operations, in addition to section 1956(a)(3)).
46. Section 1957 specifically requires that the monetary transaction be "in criminally
derived property that is ... derived from specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)
(2004). Case law supports the view that this is similar to the criminal proceeds test under
Section 1956(a). See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that "criminally derived property" under section 1957 is similar to "proceeds" under section
1956); United States v. Cavin, 38 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that payments were
proceeds of criminal activity is an essential elements ofa section 1957(a) offense).
4 7. Section 1957 specifically requires that the defendant "knowingly" engaged or
attempted to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property, and defines
"criminally derived property" as "property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained
from a criminal offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2) (2004). Section 1957(c) further clarifies
that the State need not show that the defendant "knew that the offense from which the
criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. §
1957(c) (2004). As with section 1956(a), this knowledge test focuses on the knowledge that
the transaction involved proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. See United States v.
Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998).
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I control of the
12roceeds'"'

8

In short, each statute is a slight variation on the same theme - the
defendant in some way must participate in the transfer of assets that
were the proceeds of a "specified unlawful activity," knowing or
believing that the assets were the proceeds of "some form of unlawful
activity." Section 1956 also requires that the defendant knew that the
transfer was intended to conceal the source of the funds, while Section
1957 requires that the transaction be in excess of $10,000. These
elements and their differences are discussed in more detail below.
Conduct

Section 1956(a)(l) requires that a defendant "conducts or attempts
to conduct" a transaction. 49 Similarly, and without apparent distinction,
Section 1957 focuses on whether a defendant "engages or attempts to
engage in" a transaction. 50 Section 1956(c)(2) defines "conduct"
broadly as including "initiating, concluding, or participating in
initiating, or concluding a transaction." 51 Thus, a defendant need not be
a transferee or a recipient of the funds. Participation by the U.S. parent
or the European subsidiary with the new foreign partner in the
international project and the agreements forming the basis of the
investment could constitute "conduct." In addition, employees could
bear liability for their involvement in effecting the transfer or use of
tainted funds or assets.
In contrast to Sections 1956(a)(l) and 1957, Section 1956(a)(2) is
limited to transfers and attempted transfers across a United States
border. As a consequence, Section 1956(a)(2) sometimes is referred to
as "international money laundering," while the general money
laundering statute, Section 1956(a)(l), is often referred to as "domestic
money laundering."52 However, these are misnomers. In actuality,
Section 1956(a)(l) applies to generally to any money laundering, while
Section 1956(a)(2) applies only to money laundering transactions that
cross a U.S. border.

48. Alternatively, instead of knowledge of intent to conceal, the State may show that
the defendant acted "with intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful
activity." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) with 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i).
49. 18 U.S.C § 1956(a)(l) (2004).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2004).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2) (2004).
52. See, e.g., OBERMAIER& MORVILLO, supra note 10, § 2A.02 (2001).
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This distinction was made clear in United States v. Tarkaff, where
Section 1956(a)(l) was applied successfully to a transaction occurring
wholly abroad (i.e., a transfer of funds from Curacao to Israel arranged
by the defendant while in lsrael). 53 The defendant attempted to rely on
United States v. Kramer, where the court refused to apply Section
1956(a)(2) to a transfer of money between Switzerland and
Luxembourg, since Section 1956(a)(2) required that the transfer cross a
U.S. border. 54 In Tarkaff, the Eleventh Circuit clarified the difference
between the two statutes:
Kramer does not control in this case, however, because Tarkoff was
convicted under a different subsection of the money laundering statute
(§ 1956(a)(l)(B)(i)) than the one at issue in Kramer. The difference
between the two subsections is that violation of the subsection at issue
in Kramer specifically requires a transfer of funds to or from the
United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), whereas a violation of
the subsection under which Tarkoff was convicted can occur so long
as the defendant was involved in a "financial transaction." 55

Apparently, Tarka.ff (decided in February 2001) is the first case to apply
the United States money laundering statutes to transactions occurring
wholly abroad (and, indeed, the Eleventh Circuit relies on no
precedent). 56 It signals that the so-called "domestic money laundering"
statute (§ 1956(a)(l)) is available for crimes committed anywhere,
whether in the United States, offshore, or across a U.S. border. By
doing so, the Tarka.ff decision would appear to have rendered Section
1956(a)(2) somewhat superfluous. 57
Although not stated, it is possible that the Tarka.ff court was
influenced by the extent of contact with the United States: the predicate
crime giving rise to money laundering was domestic (mail fraud based
53. United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F .3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001 ).
54. United States v. Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067 (I Ith Cir. 1996).
55. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d at 994, n.2.
56. See Ian M. Comisky & Matthew D. Lee, Targeting International Money
Laundering (Part 2): A Jurisdictional Reach Too Far, 12 J. INT'L TAX 18 (2001)
(commenting that until Tarkoff, each case money laundering case involved a "substantial
domestic nexus").
57. Section 1956(a)(l) has been used in other cases involving the transfer offunds to or
from the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Quintero, 165 F.3d 831 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999) (noting that count twenty-five was an indictment under section
1956(a)(l), but involved the transfer of funds between the United States and Switzerland);
see also United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1994) (charging defendant under
both sections 1956(a)(l) and (a)(2) for transfer of illegal proceeds from a Swiss bank to a
California bank). Recall, though, as mentioned supra note 45, that section 1956(a)(2) may
be useful to prosecutors in that it does not explicitly require proof that the funds were
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity if requisite scienter may be shown otherwise.

Published by SURFACE, 2004

17

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2004], Art. 3

244

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 31:2

on Medicare fraud). Originally, the funds were transferred to Curacao
from Miami; Tarkoff was a United States citizen and a lawyer, who had
lied to the DOJ about the existence of the funds, and flew from the
United States to Israel to help his client make the transfer from Curacao
to Israel (where Tarkoffhimself also took a portion in payment). 58
It is unclear, therefore, whether a court would be equally eager to
find jurisdiction if the case involved a less odious defendant, or a nonU. S. citizen whose conduct only partly occurred in the United States.
Nonetheless, Tarkoff demonstrates the willingness of the DOJ and the
courts to prosecute cases on the fringe of the statute - even if such
citizens are neither the transferor nor the direct or primary recipient of
the funds.
Transaction

Further evidence that the cross-border money laundering statute is
now subsumed by the general money laundering statute is the fact that
the term 'monetary instrument' means: (i) coin or currency of the
United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal
checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii) investment securities or
negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that
By contrast, "financial
title thereto passes upon delivery. "59
transaction" is broadly defined in Section 1956(c)(4) to include
monetary instruments and other types of property as well: 60
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or
foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or
other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or
(iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel,
or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial
institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree. 61

"Transaction" is defined broadly in Section 1956(c)(3) and includes a
disposition by any means. 62 The requirement that the transaction
"affects interstate or foreign commerce" is a fairly low threshold. 63 In
Tarkoff, the court found "foreign commerce" to be affected, in part

58. See Tarkoff, 242 F.3d at 992.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5) (2004).
60. See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that this is the
"only distinction" between sections 1956(a)(l) and 1956(a)(2)).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (2004).
62. Id. § 1956(c)(3).
63. Id.
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because the Israeli bank had to make calls to a bank in the United States
in order to arrange transfer from Curacao. 64 Finally, the term "financial
institution" is also broadly defined to include not only banks and
brokerages, but also travel agencies, car dealers, the U.S. Postal Service,
and any other institution as the Secretary of the Treasury may
determine. 65
Thus, it is not possible to escape liability under Section 1956(a)(l)
merely by using a foreign bank or conducting the transaction wholly
outside the United States or in non-U.S. currency or using certain nonmonetary property (e.g., vehicles or real estate). The transfer or receipt
of any funds, monetary instrument, real estate, vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft in a transaction involving criminal proceeds qualifies.
Section 1957 uses the term "monetary transaction," which is also
narrower than "financial transaction." "Monetary transaction" is
defined as:
the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as defined in
section 1956(c)( 5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial
institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title), including any
transaction that would be a financial transaction under section
1956(c)(4)(B) of this title, but such term does not include any
transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to re~resentation as
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution. 6

In other words, a "monetary transaction" is a "financial transaction" that
moves "by, through or to a financial institution."
Accordingly, prosecution under Section 1957 is available for
transactions not involving a transfer through a bank or any other
financial institution. As discussed above, this limitation could, in
theory, preclude prosecution of anyone other than a U.S. citizen for
such transaction occurring wholly outside the United States. 67
Criminal Proceeds

The crime of money laundering under Section 1956 or 1957
requires that the financial transaction "involve" the proceeds of a

64. Tarkoff, 242 F.2d at 995.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(6) (2004) (discussing the incorporation of the definition of
"financial institution" from 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2), which in tum incorporates 31 C.F.R. §
103.l l(n)).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f) (2004) (emphasis added).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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"specified unlawful activity" (i.e., the predicate crime). 68 The term
"specified unlawful activity" is defined broadly in Section 1956(c)(7) to
include numerous offenses, including drug dealing, murder-for-hire,
arson, kidnapping, foreign bribery and FCPA violations, smuggling,
counterfeiting, and various forms of fraud. 69
The requirements for a "financial transaction" (discussed above)
should not be confused with the requirements that the transaction
involve criminal proceeds. Funds, monetary instruments, real property,
vehicles, vessels, or aircraft must be involved for the transaction to
qualify as a "financial transaction," but need not themselves be
criminally derived, if other items involved in the transaction (e.g., the
items obtained in exchange for such funds) constitute proceeds of
specified unlawful activity. In other words, a payment using legitimate
funds made to, from, or within the United States may constitute money
laundering if made in payment for weapons smuggled into a foreign
country. 70 In this case, the weapons themselves would be viewed as the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity (foreign smuggling) that are
involved in a transaction that also involves a transfer of funds and,
therefore, qualifies as a "financial transaction."
Of particular concern to dealings in emerging markets is the
potential that the assets of the new foreign partner that will be used in
the international project may have derived from criminal activities,
including activities which, in such a market, are commonplace and/or
crimes that are not strictly enforced, but which constitute predicate
offenses for purposes of U.S. money laundering nevertheless. Such
potential offenses include smuggling, export control violations,
corruption, tax evasion, and other forms of fraud. 71 Recent successes in
applying the statute to the proceeds of foreign bribery and foreign tax
evasion, discussed next, have enhanced such concerns.

68. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. This requirement is not explicit for
Cross-Border Money Laundering, but is viewed as implicit. See note 46.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2004).
"The term specified unlawful activity
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(V) (2004).
means ... with respect to any financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in the United
States, an offense against a foreign nation involving ... smuggling or export control
violations involving .. .an item controlled on the United States Munitions List." Id.
71. Id.§ 1956(c)(7)(B). Foreign smuggling (i.e., smuggling in violation of the laws of
another state) is a predicate offense to money laundering under sections 1956 and 1957 if
the financial transaction constituting the money laundering occurs "in whole or in part in the
United States." Id.
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Foreign Bribery

Foreign bribery became a predicate offense to money laundering
with the addition, in 1992, of "a felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act" to the list of predicate offenses for money laundering. 72
Until 1998, an FCP A violation required the use of the mails or other
means of interstate commerce. Despite its implicit breadth, the
requirement seemed to invite circumvention through the careful
orchestration of payment schemes offshore. In 1998, the FCPA was
amended to expand its reach to conduct of U.S. persons occurring
wholly abroad and to reach the actions of other persons taking place in
the United States (regardless of whether the "means of interstate
commerce" are used). 73 However, the FCPA was (and remains) limited
to the specific conduct proscribed by its terms, which are largely
independent of considerations of the anti-bribery laws of the foreign
official's home country. 74 The Patriot Act expanded the foreign bribery
predicate for money laundering beyond the limits of the FCPA, by
amending Section 1956(c) to add the following to the list of "specified
unlawful activities":
(B) with respect to any financial transaction occurring in whole or in
part in the United States, an offense against a foreign nation
involving-... (iv) bribery of a public official, or the
misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by or for the
benefit of a public official. .. 75

Unlike the FCP A, there is no requirement that the act of bribery be

72. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
73. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(g), 78dd-2(a),(i), & 78dd-3(a) (West 2004).
74. Id. § 78dd-l(a). Specifically, the FCPA proscribes any person within its scope
(including in the case of a company, its officers, directors, employees, agents and
stockholders acting on its behalf), from corruptly making "an offer, payment, promise to
pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift or promise to give, or
authorization of the giving of anything of value to ( 1) any foreign official, political party, or
candidate for foreign public office for purposes of (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of
such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit
to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper
advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality, in order to assist such [entity] in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person, subject to certain affirmative
defenses and other limitations." Id. The FCPA does not apply, however, to conduct
specifically authorized by the home country law of the foreign official. Id. § 78dd-(b).
75. The legislative history of the Patriot Act makes clear that this language is intended
to go beyond the FCPA and cover any foreign bribery. See, e.g., Congressional Record,
October 25, 2001 (Senate), S10990-Sl 1060, at SI 1034. "For the first time, foreign
corruption offenses such as bribery and misappropriation of funds by a public official will
qualify as predicate offenses that can trigger a U.S. money laundering prosecution." Id.
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committed either by a U.S. person or within the territory of the United
States. Moreover, the new provision covers other forms of corruption
(such as embezzlement).
This predicate does not apply, however, to transactions occurring
wholly abroad, even if within the extraterritorial scope of Section 1956
and 1957. In other words, the broad foreign bribery predicate may not
be used to prosecute financial transactions occurring wholly abroad,
even if by U.S. persons, unless the foreign bribery qualifies as a
violation of the FCPA. This exception is quite narrow. As Stein
instructs, a transfer of funds across the U.S. border is considered to be
"in part in the United States" even if the defendant ordered such transfer
without setting foot in the United States. 76
As an illustration of what is now covered, suppose the new foreign
partner bribed a public official in its home country to obtain a
government license, concession, or property, which was then transferred
to the international project. This offense would not be covered by the
FCPA, unless the act of bribery (or related acts) had been conducted in
the United States or the new foreign partner had securities listed on a
U.S. exchange. This offense is, however, sufficient for the new foreign
bribery provision of Section 1956 introduced by the Patriot Act. As a
result, anyone having the requisite knowledge of the bribe (discussed
below) and "conducting" or "engaged in" such transfer may be subject
to prosecution. Depending on how the transaction was pursued and
structured, potential defendants may include not only the new foreign
partner, the international project company, and the foreign employees
(if the relevant acts occurred at least in part in the United States), but
also the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, and the U.S. employees.

Foreign Tax Evasion
Another major concern for U.S. companies doing business with
new partners in emerging markets relates to commonplace practices and
structures that may be employed by such partners in reaction to home
country taxes. Such practices may grow out of irrational tax regimes
applying high rates of tax, incomplete regulation, and limited or
selective means of domestic enforcement. In recent years, numerous
cases have reviewed the question as to whether evasion of foreign tax
constitutes a scheme to defraud for purposes of mail or wire fraud under
U.S. laws and, therefore, whether such foreign tax evasion may form a

76. Stein, No. 93-375-Sec. "N", 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8471 (E.D. La. 1994). See
supra text accompanying note 24.
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predicate offense for money laundering. 77
"Wire fraud" (or its complement, mail fraud) is often a predicate
crime for money laundering. 78 The elements of wire (or mail) fraud are
two-fold: (a) the existence of a scheme to defraud, and (b) the use of the
"mails" or the "wires" for the purpose of executing the scheme. 79 The
term "wires" is construed broadly to include any telephone or electronic
communication between the U.S. states or into or out of the U.S., and
one case has gone so far as to include wire communications between
two foreign cities (Montreal and Nassau) when made at the request of a
U.S. citizen located in the United States. 80 The wire fraud statute also
has been used to prosecute fraud that was perpetrated solely abroad (in
Croatia). 81 Telephone communication by means other than a "wire" is
even covered. 82
Whether foreign tax evasion may constitute mail or wire fraud is a
delicate question, as it implicates the common law "Revenue Rule,"
which generally prohibits the use of U.S. courts to enforce foreign tax
laws. 83 Notwithstanding some resistance based on the Revenue Rule,
courts have generally accepted the notion that foreign tax evasion is
within the ambit of mail or wire fraud and, therefore, is an appropriate
predicate for money laundering. As discussed in more detail below,
while a 1996 First Circuit case takes the opposite view, 84 more recent
cases in the Second and Fourth Circuits are supportive. 85 All of the
cases involve smuggling of tobacco or alcohol to Canada in violation of
Canadian tax and excise laws. Although these cases involve defendants

77. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1341, 1343 (2004).
78. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (discussing mail fraud);
United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 806-07 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 820
(1999) (discussing wire fraud); United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1995)
(discussing wire fraud); United States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing
wire fraud).
79. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2004).
80. See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 464 (3d Cir. 1997) (one judge
dissenting).
81. See United States v. Kim, 246 F .3d 186 (2d Cir. 2001 ). "There would seem to be no
logical reason for holding that Congress intended to punish those who cause the violation of
a law regulating and protecting foreign commerce only when they act within the borders of
the United States or that Congress is powerless to protect foreign commerce and those who
engage in foreign commerce from intentionally injurious acts, simply because those acts
occur outside our borders" (citations omitted). Id. at 189.
82. See United States v. Foley, 683 F .2d 273, 280 (8th Cir. 1982).
83. See Kovatch, Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the
Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 HOUSTON J. INT'LL. 265, 268-71 (2000).
84. See infra note 86.
85. See infra notes 87-100.
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who themselves evaded taxes, they are instructive to potential liability
for business partners of foreign tax evaders.
In 1996, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v.
Boots that foreign tax and custom frauds are not schemes to defraud
within the meaning of the wire fraud statute. 86 In reviewing a
smuggling scheme involving transportation of tobacco from Maine to
Canada, the court applied the Revenue Rule and reversed the wire fraud
conviction. 87
In 1997, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals criticized Boots in
United States v. Trapilo, stating "that a scheme to defraud the Canadian
government of tax revenue is cognizable under the federal wire fraud
statute. 88 As in Boots, the Trapilo case involves several defendants
charged in connection with alleged smuggling of tobacco and liquor
products to Canada across an Indian reservation in New York State. 89
In addition, the Trapilo opinion addressed money laundering charges
with wire fraud as a predicate offense. 90 The Second Circuit focused on
the plain language of the statute, and found that the prohibited conduct
is a "scheme to defraud" utilizing the wires, regardless of the identity
and location of the victim or the ultimate success of the scheme in
violating Canadian law. 91 By shifting the focus of the inquiry from the
need to find an actual violation of Canadian law to a determination of
the mere existence of a scheme to do so, the court relieved itself of the
obligation to pass judgment on matters of Canadian law, with the result
that the Revenue Rule was not implicated and the defendant's conduct
was amenable to action under Section 1343.92 The court cited a number
of cases that focused on the intent to defraud under United States laws,
and defendants' convictions were upheld regardless of whether the
86. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S.
905 (1996).
87. Id.
88. United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1997), cert denied 525 U.S.
812 (1998).
89. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549.
90. Id.
91. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 553. "The simple fact that the scheme to defraud involves a
foreign sovereign's revenue laws does not draw our inquiry into forbidden waters reserved
exclusively to the legislative and the executive branches of our government. We concern
ourselves only with what has been expressly forbidden by statute-the use of the wires in
the scheme to defraud. Whether our decision today indirectly assists our Canadian
neighbors in keeping smugglers at bay or assists them in the collection of taxes, is not our
Court's concern... Our goal is simply to vindicate the intended purpose of the statute, that
is, 'to prevent the use of [our telecommunications systems] in furtherance of fraudulent
enterprises."' Id.
92. Trapilo, 130 F. 3d at 552.
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attempt to defraud was successful. 93 The court further cited cases in
which wire fraud convictions were upheld in schemes to defraud foreign
victims. 94 The Second Circuit mentioned the Boots analysis of the
revenue ruling, but did not provide textual analysis on this point of the
First Circuit's decision. 95 In addition, the widely-reported Bank of New
York case involving Russian funds resulted in the filing of indictments
against bank employees in February 2000 for money laundering
predicated on wire fraud, alleging that the defendants engaged in a
scheme to defraud the Russian Government of tax revenue. 96
More recently, on July 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Pasquantino, upon rehearing en bane
rejected Boots and followed Trapilo. 97 Pasquantino involved a similar
fact pattern, where several defendants were involved in the smuggling
of alcohol to Canada in violation of Canadian tax and excise laws and
were charged with wire fraud. 98 The Court in Pasquantino criticized
Boots and rejected the argument that convictions for wire fraud would
be equivalent to enforcing the tax laws of Canada in violation of the
revenue rule. It stated that:

93. See id. In each of these cited cases, the object of the scheme to defraud was a clear
violation of United States law. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552. The Trapilo court did not directly
address the issue raised in Boots of determining whether the act committed as part of the
alleged scheme was illegal under the law of a foreign country. Id. The cases cited in
Trapilo include: United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding
convictions of mail and wire fraud notwithstanding that the prosecution failed to prove taxes
were actually due because the court focused on the .scheme, and not its success); United
States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the use of wires in
furtherance of scheme to defraud New York of cigarette taxes falls within the federal wire
fraud statute).
94. See Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552, citing United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.
1982) (involving a scheme which defrauded a corporation owned by the People's Republic
of China by fraudulent representation that non-existent ships would be available to transport
grain) and United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1987) (involving wire transfers
defrauding Canadians after stolen property passed from the United States to Canada).
95. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 550, n. 4 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483, REPORTERS NOTE at 613 (1987) that the
rationale for not enforcing tax judgments is largely obsolete).
96. United States v. Berlin, et al., 99 Cr. 914 (SWK). See United States v.
$15,270,885.69 Formerly on Deposit in Account No. 89000261137, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12602 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the indictment in an ensuing forfeiture proceeding). The
defendants ended up pleading guilty to conspiracy charges in exchange for their
cooperation. Id. See generally Larry Neumeister, Ex-Bank of NY Exec Pleads Guilty,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 14320753.
97. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming Boots and
holding that "a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenues is not cognizable
under the wire fraud statute." Id. at 295.
98. Id. at 292.
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In making this argument, the Defendants, and the First Circuit in
Boots for that matter, miss the critical point that prosecution for
violation of the federal wire statute, even when the subject of the wire
fraud scheme involved is certain tax revenue due a foreign sovereign,
does nothing civilly or criminally to enforce any tax judgments or
claims that the foreign sovereign has or may later obtain against the
defendant. Neither does such prosecution enforce the revenue laws of
the foreign sovereign involved. Rather, such prosecution seeks only
to enforce the federal wire fraud statute for the singular goal of
vindicating our government's substantial interest in preventing our
nation's interstate wire communications systems from being used in
furtherance of criminal fraudulent enterprises. 99

The principles articulated in Trapilo and Pasquantino were echoed
again in 2004 in United States v. Fountain. 100
In short, the Trapilo, Fountain, and Pasquantino cases establish a
basis for concluding that if the new foreign partner contributes funds to
the international project that are the proceeds of foreign tax evasion, all
participants in the transaction and future transactions utilizing those
same funds may be held liable if the new foreign partner utilized the
U.S. mails or wires (broadly defined) in perpetrating tax evasion and if
the participants acted with the requisite knowledge of unlawful activity.
The U.S. money laundering laws do not require a conviction of the
predicate offense, but rather only evidence (even circumstantial
evidence) that the transaction involves proceeds that derive from it. 101
For example, a case may be built around the direct links between the
unlawful activity of the new foreign partner and the assets contributed
to the international project, such as the channeling of money from a
concealed offshore account to the international project. In other
respects, a prosecutor may attempt to rely on evidence that the new
foreign partner was engaged in systematic tax evasion.
Moreover, the courts have held that, due to the fungibility of
money, it is sufficient to prove that funds came from an account in
which proceeds were commingled with other funds. 102
This
commingling rule has significant implications for dealings with new
business partners. Once the tainted funds of the new foreign partner are
commingled with clean funds earned by or contributed to the
99. Pasquantino, 336 F .3d at 299-300.
100. Fountain v. United States, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1117 (2d Cir. 2004) (involving
the same Canadian tax evasion scheme as Trapilo ).
101. See generally the discussion of the evidentiary requirements in Chapter 2A;
GREDD ET AL., MONEY LAUNDERING § 2A.02( 1], at 2A-24.
102. United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1994).
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international project company, all transactions involving the
international project company's funds may be viewed as transactions
involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.
Knowledge ofIllegality

The foregoing analysis illustrates the breadth of potential liability
for any person involved in the transaction that itself involves the tainted
funds or other proceeds of specified unlawful activity. For criminal
liability to attach, however, the defendant must have participated with
requisite knowledge as discussed in this and subsequent sections. The
knowledge elements are vital to mitigating liability.
U.S. money laundering laws require knowledge that the funds
represent proceeds from an unlawful activity (not specifically a
"specified unlawful activity," as described above). The statute defines
this to mean: "the person knew that the property involved in the
transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State,
Federal or foreign law... " 103 Foreign tax evasion, bribery, and other
offenses may be considered "felonies" for this ~urpose if they are
punishable by confinement of more than one year. 1 A defendant need
not know that the crimes are indeed felonies. 105 Moreover, a defendant
need not know the specific crimes from which the funds derive. 106
For corporate defendants, knowledge may be inferred, under the
principle of "collective knowledge," from the totality of information
learned by employees in the course of their employment. 107 The

103. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(l) (2004) (emphasis added).
104. See U.S.S.G. § 2Ll.2, 18 U.S.C. § 2Ll.2 (2004) (defining a "felony" for purposes
of sentencing); see, e.g., Russian Criminal Code, art. 199 (providing that tax evasion is
punishable by confinement for up to 5 years); see id., art. 193 (providing that capital flight is
punishable by confinement for up to 3 years); see id., art. 290 (providing that payment of a
bribe is punishable by confinement for up to 5 years).
105. United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1066-68 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
827 (1999) (citing legislative history, rejecting the "I thought it was only a misdemeanor"
defense in a case involving the laundering of gambling proceeds).
106. United States v. Reiss, 186 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding defendant guilty
of money laundering though he did not know the specific criminal source of the funds);
United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bornfield, 145
F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding in each case that the defendant only needs to
know that property is "criminally derived" and not the specific criminal activity).
107. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987)
(finding proper an instruction to the jury that "the knowledge of [each] individual employee
acting within the scope of their employment is imputed to the bank" in a case involving
failure by bank to report withdrawals in excess of $10,000); United States v. PenagaricanoSoler, 911 F.2d 833, 843 (1st Cir. 1990); see also, Tania Brief and Terrell Mcsweeny,
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principle of "collective knowledge" effectively imposes upon a
corporation (be it the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, or the
international project company) a duty to carefully collect and evaluate
the totality of information and rumors learned by its employees about
the new foreign partner's activities and sources of funds.
In addition, U.S. courts repeatedly have found circumstantial
evidence sufficient to prove a defendant's subjective knowledge of the
unlawful source of funds (e.g., when a defendant knew that the provider
of the funds engaged in criminal activity). 108 While it is clear that
showing a defendant "should have known" about the illegal source or
acted in "reckless disregard" of same is insufficient, courts also have
found knowledge to exist where a defendant was "willfully blind." 109
Simply put, willful blindness is deliberate ignorance -- the sense that "I
do not want to know about this" and ignoring or not investigating
certain "flags of suspicion." 110 Under one formulation, a showing of
willful blindness of an operative fact will suffice if: "the defendant was
aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact, yet deliberately
avoided lea.ming whether the fact existed, with the conscious purpose of
evading criminal liability, unless the defendant genuinely believed that
the fact did not exist." 111

Corporate Criminal Liability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 337, 347 (2003). "The 'collective
knowledge' doctrine imputes to a corporation the sum knowledge of all or some of its
employees-aggregating individual employee's knowledge for the purpose of creating the
necessary guilty intent for the corporation. Thus, a corporation may be liable even if there is
no single employee at fault. In this way, the collective knowledge doctrine prevents
corporations from evading liability by compartmentalizing and dividing employee duties."
Id. [footnotes omitted].
108. United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding circumstantial
evidence that defendant should have known that the money wired to her was drug money
because the defendant knew that the party wiring her money was a drug dealer); United
States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 760 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that circumstantial evidence
may be used to establish defendant's knowledge); United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 577
(7th Cir. 2000), United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1995), United States v.
Macko, 994 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir. 1993), United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1202
(1st Cir. 1991) (holding in each case that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a
conviction).
109. See United States v. Bader, 956 F.2d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1992); see also S. Rep.
No. 99-433, at 6-8 (1986).
110. See United States v. Smith, 46 F.3d 1223, 1237 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that the
defendant was willfully blind when he left the room during a discussion of the scheme
saying, "I don't want to hear this"); United States v. Coviello, 225 F.3d 54, 70 (1st Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1102 (2001).
111. United States v. Ebert, 178 F.3d 1287, *32-33 (4th Cir. 1999); see Robin
Charlow, Willful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1413-18
(1992); cf, e.g., United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Cunningham, 83 F.3d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Whittington, 26
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This doctrine allows a jury to impute knowledge to a defendant
who strongly suspects (but does not know for sure) the existence of the
operative fact that makes his conduct unlawful and deliberately closes
his eyes to the existence of that fact in an attempt to avoid criminal
liability. Knowledge of "rumors" about potential criminal activity or
associations with criminals and a failure to investigate them, may
constitute willful blindness. 112 The doctrine of willful blindness applies
equally to corporate defendants. 113
Accordingly, knowledge of the illegal source of the new foreign
partner's contributions to the international project may be inferred if
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that a defendant knew of such
illegal source or if such defendant is found to have ignored and failed to
investigate "red flags" or rumors, or knew that the new foreign partner
engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, any information that comes to
the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, the international project
company, or any of the employees or agents regarding potential tax
evasion, bribery or other illegal conduct of the new foreign partner or
their principals, associations with organized crime figures or with
potentially corrupt government officials, should be promptly
investigated.
Knowledge ofIntent to Conceal
The final element in the analysis under Section 1956 is whether a
defendant knew "that the transaction is designed in whole or in
part... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownershif, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity." 14 As noted in Table 2 above, this element is not required for
violations of Section 1957. To satisfy this element, a defendant need
not intend the concealment or disguise; he need only know that this was

F.3d 456, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir.
1991); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1543 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d
361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985): United States v. Restrapo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 n.2 (5th Cir.
1978).
112. United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
defendant turned a blind eye to rumors of a friend's involvement with drug sales and close
relationship with drug dealers).
113. Brief & Mcsweeny, supra note 107. "Corporations can be criminally liable for
deliberately disregarding criminal activity. The 'willful blindness' doctrine is usually
applied to situations where a corporate agent became suspicious of a criminal violation, but
deliberately took no action to mitigate or investigate further in order to avoid culpability."
Id. [footnotes omitted].
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) (2004).
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the intention of the perpetrator of the underlying crime. Such
knowledge may also be proven circumstantially or from "willful
blindness." 115 One court has gone so far as to say that proof of
knowledge of the intent to conceal or disguise the source of funds is
obvious, if the first knowledge element is met, since any person
knowingly using illegal proceeds would obviously know of the intent to
conceal the source.11 6 However, some courts recognize this second
knowledge element as distinguishing transactions in furtherance of the
overall money laundering scheme from ordinary spending of tainted
funds. 117 According to this view, payment of ordinary business
expenses with tainted funds does not constitute money laundering in
violation of Section 1956; rather, it is a violation of the "money
spending" proscribed by Section 1957. 118
It is difficult to predict how this element of the money laundering
offense will apply to a defendant. Liability would largely depend on
how disbursements from the new foreign partner to the international
project company, and onward disbursements, are made. The court in
United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel suggested certain indicia that a court
could consider to determine whether a scheme is designed to conceal or
disguise. 119 The elements the court mentioned include among others:
• unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction;
• structuring the transaction to avoid attention;
• depositing illegal profits in the bank account of a legitimate
business;
• highly irregular features of the transaction;
• using third parties to conceal the real owners; and
• a series of unusual financial moves culminating in the
transaction. 120
These indicia of intent to conceal and disguise may be overcome by
avoiding complicated financial structures and through reasonable due
diligence, investigation, and disclosure. (See recommendations in
115. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992).
116. United States v. Conley, 833 F.Supp. 1121, 1146 n.17 (W.D. Pa. 1993), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 37 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1994).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1999) (commenting
that the money laundering statute, section 1956, should not have turned into section 1957,
the money spending statute which does not require any intent or design to conceal and,
therefore, captures any knowing spending of tainted funds, including paying legitimate
business expenses).
118. Brown, 186 F.3d at 668.
119. United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994).
120. Id.
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Section III below.)
Section 2314 (Transportation of Stolen Money)

In addition to indictments under Sections 1956 and 1957, a money
laundering case may also proceed with an indictment under Section
2314 (transportation of stolen money) as a separate or predicate
offense. 121 Under Section 2314:
[W]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, or money, of value of
$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or
taken by fraud ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 10 years or both. 122

Under the statute, it is illegal to transport (or wire) fraudulentlyobtained funds in foreign commerce (i.e., into or out of the United
States). Therefore, if any part of the tainted funds of the new foreign
partner moves through the United States, those persons responsible for
such movement (and anyone conspiring with them or assisting them in
such movement of funds) may be in violation of Section 2314, as long
as they "knew" that the funds were the proceeds of foreign tax evasion
or other fraud. Unlike Section 1956(a)(2), which similarly addresses
transfers across U.S. borders, Section 2314 does not require knowledge
of any intent to conceal and, therefore, is more akin to Section 1957.
Moreover, Section 2314 captures transactions at a lower threshold (at
least $5,000 in value), as well as transfers that do not involve a financial
institution.
Penalties under Section 2314 are similar to those under Section
1957. The maximum confinement penalty is like that of Section 1957
(ten years), half the maximum term prescribed by Section 1956. In
addition, Section 2314 was amended in 1994 to substitute the outdated
maximum fine (formerly, $10,000) with the phrase "under this title." 123
The maximum fine is now $250,000 (individual) or $500,000
(organization) or, up to twice the defendant's gross gain (or the victim's
gross loss) on the transaction, if such calculation does not unduly

121. See United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1042 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 857 (1992) (holding that because transportation of stolen money qualified as a
predicate offense ("specified unlawful activity") for purposes of sections 1956 and 1957, it
is clear that Congress intended them to be separate offenses).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2004).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2004); see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 330016, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C.
§ 13701 (1994)).
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complicate the proceeding. 124
Section 1962 (RICO)
Finally, if the new foreign partner is found to have engaged in a
"pattern of racketeering activity," their investment and interest in the
international project may be found to be in violation of Section 1962(a)
or Section 1962(b), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) statute. A "pattern of racketeering activity" may be established
by as few as two counts of wire fraud or money laundering. A RICO
violation may also form the basis for private civil liability, although it
has been recently held that the courts will not entertain civil RICO
actions brought by foreign governments for revenue lost from evasion
of their tax laws. 125

Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATING RISK
The breadth of the U.S. money laundering laws indicates the
importance of appropriate measures to mitigate the risk of violation,
particularly for companies engaging in business transactions with new
foreign partners, and particularly in emerging markets or elsewhere,
where good business practices are not well-established and little is
known about such partners and their activities. As discussed above, if a
predicate offense was established, a defendant's risk of liability would
turn on his knowledge of the new foreign partner's misdeeds. Such
knowledge could be inferred from a failure by a defendant to investigate
his suspicions, and his knowledge of any efforts to "conceal" the source
of funds (e.g., via an unusually strict confidentiality agreement or a
complicated financial structure). Accordingly, the risk of liability may
be mitigated through due diligence and disclosure. As a starting point, a
professional investigator should be employed to conduct a background
check on the new foreign partner and its ·source of funds. If there is a
basis for some suspicion, the investigation should seek detailed
information as to, e.g.:
• the identity and background of the new foreign partner and
any individuals beneficially owning or controlling the new
foreign partner and the entities that the new foreign partner
will designate for participation in the international project;
124. 18 U.S.C §§ 3571(b)(3), (c)(3), & (d) (2004).
125. See, e.g., European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 497
(2d Cir. 2004); Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268
F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000, 154 L. Ed. 2d 394, 123 S. Ct. 513
(2002).
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•

the business purposes for inclusion of such individuals in
the international project (i.e., the commercial value they
add);
• the principal businesses of the participating entities;
• the sources of the funds in the account from which the
funds for the international project are to be transferred; and
• the same information with respect to all affiliates that the
new foreign partner plans to involve in the international
project (contractors, purchasers, or suppliers).
Adequate due diligence will be of paramount importance in order
for the U.S. parent to obtain reasonable comfort that the resources
contributed by the new foreign partner are, in fact, clean. However,
disclosures of this kind may prove difficult for the new foreign partner
to accept, as they may view them as invasive and unusual. In such case,
the U.S. parent and European subsidiary may agree to preserve the
confidentiality regarding the sources and ownership of the new foreign
partner's resources. To further allay discomfort, particularly if the new
foreign partner and the U.S. parent are competitors, they may agree to
appoint a neutral and trusted third party to review the necessary
information and make certain certifications to the U.S. parent.
If the results of these inquiries are acceptable and the parties decide
to proceed, then protective measures, tailored to the specifics of the
international project and planned transfers of funds, should be adopted
and implemented. Such measures may include the following:
• The international project agreements should include
representations and warranties by the new foreign partner as
to the identity of each of their principals, the scope of their
business activities, and their sources of funds.
• Strict procedures should be established within the
international project company to monitor outflows to ensure
that they are for legitimate business expenses to reputable
third parties.
• Particular scrutiny should be applied to payments to any
entity affiliated with the new foreign partner.
• Should any rumors or other "flags of suspicion" regarding
the activities of the new foreign partner come the U.S.
parent's attention, the U.S. parent would have the right to
investigate them, and the new foreign partner would be
under an obligation to cooperate.
• Corporate procedures should be established within the U.S.
parent, the European subsidiary (and any other affiliate of
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the U.S. parent involved in the international project) for
reporting to the U.S. parent's management any information
or rumor learned regarding any possible criminal activity of
the new partner or any other investors, partners, suppliers,
or contractors involved in the international project, and for
investigating such information and rumors.
The international project agreements should include
escape/termination rights for the U.S. parent and the
European subsidiary, should any investigation identify
wrongdoing.
Exclusions should be carved into any confidentiality
agreements related to the international project, so that the
U.S. parent and the European subsidiary may make
disclosures regarding the source of funds as necessary or
appropriate in connection with any government
investigation or judicial proceeding.
The business purposes for complicated transactional
structuring should be clearly documented and supported by
sound tax and/or commercial strategies.
Payments to third parties should be made directly to the
intended beneficiaries and not to intermediaries.
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